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High-dimensional entanglement promises to increase the information capacity of photons and is
now routinely generated exploiting spatio-temporal degrees of freedom of single photons. A curious
feature of these systems is the possibility to certify entanglement despite strong noise in the data.
We show that it is also possible to exploit this noisy entanglement by introducing a protocol that
uses mutliple subspaces of the high-dimensional system simultaneously. Our protocol can be used to
increase key rates in realistic conditions. To that end, we conduct two simulations of our protocol for
noise models that apply to the two most commonly used sources of high-dimensional entanglement:
time-bins and spatial modes.
Quantum communication is one of the most mature
areas of quantum technologies, with Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD) [1–5] as its most prominent example.
QKD is a cryptographic primitive that allows two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to securely establish a shared secret
key in the presence of an adversary, Eve. QKD proto-
cols can be roughly classified according to the variables
used for the encoding (discrete versus continuous [6–8]),
the presence or absence of entanglement between the le-
gitimate parties (prepare and measure [1, 9, 10] versus
entanglement-based [2, 11, 12]), the dimension of the en-
coding states (qubit [1, 2, 9, 11] versus qudit [13–28]) ver-
sus continuous variable [7, 29–36], and the level of trust
that the legitimate parties have on their devices (trusted
devices [1, 9, 11] versus partially device independent [37–
44] versus fully device independent [45–49]). In this let-
ter we are focusing on trusted-device high-dimensional
discrete-variable entanglement-based protocols which are
widely implemented by using temporal (time-bin [50–52])
or spatial encoding [53–57].
The majority of practical QKD implementations uses
binary encoding of quantum states in photons, such as
polarisation [58] or time-bin qubits [59]. Entanglement
in multiple degrees of freedom, i.e. high-dimensional en-
tanglement [60, 61], has some obvious advantages. Up
to log(d) bits can be encoded into a single photon using
d degrees of freedom. This potentially addresses one of
the biggest challenges of QKD, namely the low rates com-
pared to classical cryptographic protocols. There is, how-
ever, another curious feature when turning to entangle-
ment based quantum communication. High-dimensional
entanglement features a noise resistance that increases
with the coding dimension. This leads to practical
ways of distributing entanglement with high-losses, back-
ground light or other sources of noise [62, 63]. One of the
open problems here is the question, whether this surviv-
ing entanglement can actually be useful. In other words,
‘can we still harness the high-dimensional nature of en-
tanglement in situations where noise dominates the sig-
nal and qubit based QKD would be impossible? In this
letter we affirmatively answer that question and provide
a simultaneous subspace coding protocol for QKD and
provide extensive noise models for the two paradigmatic
sources of high dimensional entanglement to showcase
the suitability of the protocol for practical advantages
in QKD. The advantage of projecting onto subspaces is
twofold: first, a further increase in visibility through sub-
space post-selection, second, a decrease in the alphabet
implies a smaller toll on the key rate in the error correc-
tion phase.
The protocol : The general idea of the protocol is to use
a genuine d × d dimensional entangled quantum system
to perform multiple instances of a QKD protocol dividing
the outcomes in different subspaces. To this end let H =
HA⊗HB be the joint Hilbert space of the system shared
by Alice and Bob, A and B, with dim(H) = d × d. In
principle the choice of the subspaces is arbitrary, but to
simplify the notation we will formulate the protocol using
multiple subpaces of size k. To this end let d = `·k. Then
bothHA andHB can be divided into ` subspaces of size k
as HA = HA0⊕· · ·⊕HA`−1 and HB = HB0⊕· · ·⊕HB`−1 .
The QKD protocol, we present next, requires two mea-
surement settings – the computational basis measure-
ment and a measurement in a basis which is mutually
unbiased with respect to the computational basis in each
subspace of size k. Therefore, let {Ax1}d−1x=0 and {By1}d−1y=0
denote the projectors onto computational basis of HA
and HB , respectively, and {Ax2}d−1x=0, {By2}d−1y=0 are sums
of mutually unbiased measurements in subspaces of size
k. Formally, Ax2 = UA
x
1U
† and By2 = U
∗By1U
>, where
U =
∑`−1
m=0
∑k−1
i,j=0 ω
ij
k |mk + i〉 〈mk + j| and ωk = e
2pii
k .
Alice’s measurement outcome x = mk + i is interpreted
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2as outcome i in the m-th subspace. Bob’s measurement
outcome y is interpreted analogously.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
Protocol 1 Subspace QKD
1: Distribution. A source distributes a state ρAB to Alice
and Bob.
2: Measurement. Upon receiving the state, Alice and Bob
choose independently at random bits wA and wB , respec-
tively, such that p(wA = 1) = p(wB = 1) = γ  1. If
wA = 0, Alice performs a measurement in the {Ax1}d−1x=0
basis, otherwise she measures in {Ax2}d−1x=0. Similarly, Bob
measures his part of the state in {By1}d−1y=0 or {By2}d−1y=0,
accordingly. They record the outcomes in the register X
and Y respectively. Steps 1 and 2 are repeated N times.
3: Subspace selection. Through a classical public authen-
ticated channel, Alice and Bob reveal for each iteration
their basis choice and the values mA and mB of the sub-
spaces their outcomes belong to.
• If mA = mB = m, and Alice and Bob had outcomes
x = mk + i and y = mk + j, they set M = m and
x′ = i and y′ = j, respectively.
• If mA 6= mB , they set M =⊥, x′ = y′ =⊥, and
discard the round
4: Sifting and Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob use
the test rounds and some of the key generation rounds to
estimate correlations for each block M = m. The remain-
ing measurement results form the raw key.
5: Information reconciliation and Privacy amplifica-
tion. Alice and Bob proceed with information reconcili-
ation and privacy amplification in each subspace and ex-
tract the final key.
In this letter we show that one can use high-
dimensional entanglement with the above protocol to ob-
tain an advantage in the key rate over both qubit proto-
cols and high-dimensional protocols which use the whole
space to extract the final key.
In order to assess the efficiency of the protocol, we
calculate the achievable key rate K in the asymptotic
limit (N → ∞). Additionally, we assume that Eve is
restricted to collective attacks, i.e., at each iteration she
is attacking identically and independently of the previ-
ous, and she can perform a measurement on her ancillary
system at any future time. This assumption can be later
dropped with a de Finetti-type argument [64, 65] and
thus security against any general coherent attack can be
obtained [66]. Furthermore, we assume that Eve prepares
the entangled states that Alice and Bob share. Proving
security under this assumption implies security for any
implementation of the protocol. Under these assump-
tions [67], the asymptotic key rate is given by [68, 69]:
K ≥ H(X|ET ) − H(X|Y ), where H(X|ET ) is the von
Neumann entropy of Alice’s key round outcome X con-
ditioned on the total information available to the eaves-
dropper Eve at the end of Step 4, given that Eve holds
a purification of the distributed state ρAB , and H(X|Y )
is the conditional Shannon entropy between Alice’s and
Bob’s key round outcomes.
The asymptotic key rate of the Subspace QKD proto-
col, (Protocol 1), can be calculated in similar fashion and
is given by
KTOT ≥
`−1∑
m=0
P (M = m)Km, (1)
where P (M = m) is the probability that both Alice
and Bob obtain an outcome in subspace m and Km is
the rate in subspace m, given by Km = H(X
′|ET )ρ˜m −
H(X ′|Y ′)ρ˜m , where ρ˜m is the state effectively shared by
the parties in the subspace m. (For a precise definition
of the state ρ˜m, and detailed proof of this result see Ap-
pendix A.I).
In order to compute the key rate Km for the subspace
m we lower bound the conditional entropy H(X ′|ET )ρ˜m
by the conditional min-entropy: H(X ′|ET )ρ˜m ≥
Hmin(X
′|ET )ρ˜m , where Hmin(X ′|ET )ρ˜m = − logPmg
and Pmg is the average guessing probability computed
using the effective state ρ˜m. To determine Pmg , for a
subspace m from measurement results, we use the corre-
lations of Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes in the second basis,
expressed as
Wmk =
k−1∑
i=0
P (ii|22,m), (2)
where P (ii|22,m) = P (x=mk+i,y=mk+i|22)P (M=m) is the proba-
bility that Alice and Bob obtain equal outcomes when
they measure in the basis {Ax2}d−1x=0 and {By2}d−1y=0 and ob-
tain outcomes in the subspace m. In Appendix A.II, we
present and solve the optimization problem that allows to
show that Eve’s guessing probability for the subspace m
can be expressed as a function of the subspace dimension
k and the correlation Wmk by:
Hmin(X
′|ET )ρ˜m =−log2
(
(
√
Wmk +
√
(k−1)(1−Wmk ))
2
k
)
. (3)
The conditional entropy H(X ′|Y ′)ρ˜m for the subspace
m can be estimated using the probability distribution of
outcomes in the basis {Ax1}d−1x=0 and {By1}d−1y=0.
Isotropic state example: Here, we derive the total key
rate obtainable in practical QKD setups, where the pre-
pared state is an isotropic state ρd(v) = v|ψ+d 〉〈ψ+d | +
(1−v)
d2 1d ⊗ 1d, with visibility v. Let us first calculate
the asymptotic key rate in case k = d, that is, Alice
and Bob use standard QKD and derive the key from
the whole available Hilbert space. Applying the test
round measurement of both Alice and Bob to ρd(v)
leads to Wd = v +
1−v
d and thus via equation (3)
H(X|ET ) ≥ − log2
(
(
√
vd+1−v+(d−1)√1−v)2
d2
)
. To deter-
mineH(X|Y ), we observe that, given ρd(v), the probabil-
ity distribution for Alice obtaining result x and Bob ob-
taining result y in the key rounds is given by Pkey(xy) =
3v
δxy
d +
1−v
d2 , and the respective conditional probability
distribution is Pkey(x|y) = vδxy + 1−vd .
Similar calculations can be done in case Alice and Bob
perform Protocol 1 with subspacesHAm⊗HBm of size k×
k. In such a case they effectively measure the state ρmk (v˜)
in each subspace m, which can obtained by projecting
ρd(v) onto this subspace. Because of the symmetry of
ρd(v), the state ρ
m
k (v˜) is independent of m and its density
matrix is equivalent to ρk(v˜) = v˜|ψ+k 〉〈ψ+k | + (1−v˜)k2 1k ⊗
1k, where
∣∣ψ+k 〉 = 1√k∑k−1i=0 |ii〉 and v˜ = v˜(d, v, k) :=
vd/(vd+ k − vk).
For each subspace H(X ′|ET )ρ˜m and H(X ′|Y ′)ρ˜m we
can now set ρ˜m = ρk(v˜). Test round measurements of
this state lead to Wmk =
vd+1−v
vd+k−vk , which (using Eq. (3))
results in:
H(X ′|ET )ρ˜m ≥ − log2
(
(
√
vd+1−v+(k−1)√1−v)2
k(vd+k−vk)
)
. (4)
Evaluating also H(X ′|Y ′)ρk(v˜) and summing over all sub-
spaces leads to:
KisoTOT(d, v, k)≥
(
vd+k−vk
d
)
log2
(
k
(
√
vd+1−v+(k−1)√1−v)2
)
+(vd+1−vd )log2(vd+1−v)+ (k−1)(1−v)d log2(1−v). (5)
For each d and v, which are usually known experimen-
tal parameters, one can optimize KisoTOT(d, v, k) over the
subspace size k to determine the protocol implementation
that leads to the optimal key rate. Another interesting
property one can investigate is the critical visibility, i.e.
at which visibility one cannot obtain a positive key rate
anymore. This is generally a rather complicated function
of both k and d. However, considering even d and k = 2,
it can be shown that positive key rate can be obtained for
v > 11+0.84d . In particular, in case of constant v, one can
always obtain a positive key rate by increasing the global
dimension d. This is in accordance with the intuition –
the robustness of entanglement in the isotropic state in-
creases with the dimension. In practice, however, the
visibility v is not a constant, but rather a function of the
dimension d. Moreover, this function crucially depends
on the physical implementation of qudits. To make the
discussion complete, in what follows we provide dimen-
sion dependent noise models for the two most common
ways to produce and control high-dimensional quantum
states – temporal and spatial degrees of freedom in pho-
tons.
Realistic noise models: When it comes to realis-
tic noisy implementations, the different behavior of
high-dimensional systems and many copies of a two-
dimensional system stems from the way the noise inter-
acts with the information carrier. This interaction de-
pends on the implementation of the high-dimensional sys-
tem. Our work aims at showcasing that high-dimensional
entanglement can be advantageous for QKD purposes,
and to this end, we study two different state-of-the-
art implementations of our protocol. The first employs
temporal and the second spatial degrees of freedom of
photons for the generation of high-dimensional entangle-
ment. The motivation for using these particular setups
is that recently they were shown to provide an advan-
tage for entanglement certification [70]. To start with the
temporal implementation we consider a hyper-entangled
state of the form |Ψ〉 = |φ−〉AB⊗
∫
dtf(t) |t〉A⊗|t〉B . The
part of the state entangled in energy-time is produced
by a laser source via spontaneous parametric down-
conversion, and the interference of photons in the tempo-
ral domain is subsequently enabled by introducing entan-
glement in polarization by means of |φ−〉AB . See also [70]
and Appendix A.III. Alice and Bob measure the time of
arrival, t, of the photons, i.e., the time when the detec-
tors click. The maximum resolution with which they can
detect photons arriving at the same time is given by the
duration of a time bin, tb, and with respect to tb, they
determine a time frame, F , outside of which any photon
arriving is considered “lost”. In particular, they choose
F = dtb for d ∈ N , effectively discretizing the energy-
time space to obtain a space of dimension d; the encod-
ing space. The frames in which they both had one click
are post-selected and used for estimating the key rate. In
Appendix A.III we present a noise model for this setup,
in which we take into account noise effects due to the
interaction of the photons with the environment and due
to the detectors. In particular, photons might be lost be-
fore arriving to the lab, and other photons coming from
the environment (and not from the laser source) might
enter and make the detectors click. Note that the envi-
ronmental photons are the main source of noise for this
implementation. Moreover, there exist dark counts, i.e.,
detector clicks in the absence of a photon, while there
might not be a click in the presence of a photon. We
can, then, express the key rate as a function of the di-
mension d and the visibility v, which is the probability
that, given that both Alice and Bob had one click, this
click is due to a photon coming from the laser source and
not due to an environmental photon or a dark count. For
this model the visibility is given as
v = 1/(1 + dtbTATBγ
−1), (6)
and the production rate of post-selected frames/s is
R(d, v) = e−d tb(TA+TB+γ)(d tbTATB + γ), (7)
where TA/B , γ are experimental parameters incorporat-
ing all quantities that are independent of d. Specifically,
TA/B is the average number of uncorrelated clicks per
second, coming from dark counts, environmental photons
or laser photons when one of the parties is affected by
losses or detectors’ inefficiencies; γ is the average num-
ber of detected entangled photons per second, i.e, the
photons coming from the laser source that were not lost
and produced a click. Finally, the achievable key rate ex-
pressed in bits/s is K = R(d, v)KisoTOT(d, v, k). In Figure
1, we plot K versus the noise-to-signal ratio for different
subspace-dimension choices k in various total dimensions
4d. We observe that the most noise-robust choice for any
d is the one where two-dimensional subspaces are consid-
ered. Nevertheless, choosing subspaces with dimension
higher than two provides considerably higher key rates
at lower noise regimes.
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FIG. 1. Here, we show achievable key rate vs noise-to-signal
ratio for the temporal domain. The noise/signal ratio here
is defined as the average number of non-entangled photons
that arrive in the lab (including singles and taking into ac-
count detector inefficiencies) divided by the overall average
number of clicks per second, assuming that these quantities
are the same for both parties. For this implementation this
quantity is dimension-independent. Since we vary the frame
sizes, but not the bin sizes, the end points are independent of
the total dimension and the optimal noise resistance is always
achieved in two-dimensional subspaces. The plot illustrates
the fact that choosing higher dimensional subspace encodings,
however, can significantly increase the total key rate at lower
noise levels.
Moving on, to photons entangled in spatial degrees
of freedom. Due to spatial symmetry, the state pro-
duced by the laser source should be of the form |Ψ〉 =∑∞
l=−∞ cl |l〉A |−l〉B , where l denotes momentum modes
and cl depends on the source specifications. This state is
subsequently projected in a space spanned by a finite sub-
set of modes, l, with cardinality d; our encoding space,
hence arises from an effective discretization with respect
to the finite resolution of the detectors. For details, see
[70] and our Appendix A.IV. In our noise model, we con-
sider noise effects originating from losses, environmental
photons, detector inefficiencies and dark counts. For the
key rate, Alice and Bob post-select the rounds in which
they both obtained one click, and just like in the previ-
ous implementation, the visibility v includes the rounds
where the clicks came from a source photon pair. Hence,
in this implementation each party needs a detector for
each mode, resulting in dark counts contributing the most
to noise through more frequent accidental coincidences.
We calculate the visibility to be
v =
e
γ
d − 1
e
γ
d − 1 + d[1− e−(µA+ ξAd )][1− e−(µB+ ξBd )] , (8)
and the rate of post-selected rounds/s is given by
R(d, v) = Ce−d(µ
A+µB)e
(ξA+ξB)
d (9)
×
{
d2
[
1−e−µA−
ξA
d
][
1−e−µB−
ξB
d
]
+d
(
e
γ
d −1
)}
,
where µA/B is the average number of dark counts per de-
tector, ξA/B is the average number of uncorrelated pho-
tons due to the environment, losses and detector inef-
ficiencies, γ is the average number of detectable corre-
lated photons, and finally C is a related, also dimension-
independent, parameter (for details see the calculations
in Appendix A.IV). We can now express the achievable
key rate in bits/s as K = R(d, v)KisoTOT(d, v, k). In Fig-
ure 2, we plot K vs the total dimension d for different
choices of the subspace size k. We observe that the key
rate increases as the dimension d increases, but only up
to a certain limit, and for different d the choice of the op-
timal [71] subspace size is different. Importantly enough,
this plot clearly shows the advantage of using subspace
instead of full-space encoding; notice that the optimal
key rate in the case of full-space encoding is an order of
magnitude smaller than the key rate that can be achieved
with an appropriate choice of subspace encoding.
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FIG. 2. Here, we plot achievable key rates vs system dimen-
sion for different subspace encodings in the spatial domain.
The parameters that we use here are: detector efficiencies
PC = 60%, losses for one party of PL = 98, 4%, dark counts
µ = 300 clicks/s, environmental photons ν = 2000 photons/s,
coincidence window ∆t = 10−7s, average laser photons (at
source) λ = 40000 photons/s. The dominant noise contribu-
tion comes from additional detector dark counts increasing
the accidental probability and thus decreasing signal-to-noise
ratio. A few direct conclusions can be drawn here, first, it is
evident that increasing the Hilbert space by adding detectors
imposes a natural limit beyond which the extra dimensions
are not useful, but in fact detrimental. Second, different sub-
space sizes are optimal for different total dimensions. Lastly,
except for small dimensions, the subspace encoding tremen-
dously increases key rates over traditional full encoding.
5Conclusions: We have presented a simultaneous k-
dimensional subspace QKD protocol for d-dimensional
quantum systems. Using two noise models for the most
paradigmatic platforms for photonic high-dimensional
entanglement, we showcase that the protocol can indeed
provide a viable pathway towards practically improved
QKD. Most of the improvement comes from the fact that
subspaces of high-dimensional systems are more resilient
to physical noise [62], compared to direct coding in a
comparable dimension. Surprisingly, the optimal sub-
space size even in noisy scenarios often goes beyond two
dimensions.
The actual value of achievable key rates highly depends
on the implementation and specific noise parameters,
from dark counts and background to losses and device
fidelities. To showcase the capabilities of the proposed
protocol, we have chosen two of the most paradigmatic
state-of-the-art experimental implementations [62]. For
all parameter ranges, high-dimensional encodings led to
improved key rates. We believe that the noise models
we provide, together with the SDPs for computing key
rates of our protocol, will be useful for optimising system
parameters for a broad family of future setups.
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7APPENDIX
A.I. Key rates of the subspace QKD protocol
In this appendix we prove that the key rate of the Subspace-QKD protocol, Protocol 1, can be computed using the
key rates of each subspace, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The asymptotic key rate of the subspace-QKD protocol, Protocol 1, is given by
KTOT ≥
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m) (H(X ′|E)ρ˜m −H(X ′|Y ′)ρ˜m) , (A.1)
where the conditional entropies are evaluated on the states ρ˜mX′Y ′E given by
ρ˜mX′Y ′E = (EMX′Y ′←AB ⊗ idE)(
∣∣∣ψ˜mABE〉) (A.2)
and
∣∣∣ψ˜mABE〉 is the purification of the state
ρmAB =
ΠmA ⊗ΠmB (ρAB)ΠmA ⊗ΠmB
p(M = m)
(A.3)
with
p(M = m) = Tr(ΠmA ⊗ΠmB ρAB). (A.4)
Proof. The protocol explores multiple subspaces of size k, where d = ` ·k. Then both HA and HB can be divided into
` subspaces of size k as HA = HA0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ HA`−1 and HB = HB0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ HB`−1 .
The QKD protocol involves two measurement settings: {Ax1}d−1x=0 and {By1}d−1y=0 denote the computational bases of
HA and HB , respectively, and {Ax2}d−1x=0, {By2}d−1y=0 are sums of mutually unbiased measurements in subspaces of size
k. Formally, Ax2 = UA
x
1U
† and By2 = U
∗By1U
>, where U =
∑`−1
m=0
∑k−1
i,j=0 ω
ij
k |mk + i〉 〈mk + j| and ωk = e
2pii
k . Note
that the two measurements of the parties are block diagonal with blocks of size k. Therefore, Alice’s measurement
outcome x = mk + i is interpreted as outcome i in the m-th subspace. Bob’s measurement outcomes are interpreted
analogously.
The subspace-QKD protocol, given in Protocol 1, can be divided in the following maps
ESubspaceQKDKAKBE′′←ABE(ρABE) = EIR−PAKAKBE′′←X′Y ′E′ ◦ ESubX′Y ′E′←XYE ◦ (EMXY←AB ⊗ idE)(ρABE). (A.5)
where EMXY←AB⊗idE represents the measurements implemented in Step 2, ESubX′Y ′E′←XYE corresponds to the subspace
selection implemented in Step 3, and finally EIR−PAKAKBE′′ describes the classical post-processing applied to the raw key
consisting of information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The difference between the subspace-QKD protocol, Protocol 1, and a standard high-dimensional QKD protocol is
in the subspace selection described in Step 3. The selection of subspaces, Step 3 in Protocol 1, corresponds to Alice
and Bob applying a local projection described by {Πm}`−1m=0 with elements
Πm =
k−1∑
i=0
|mk + i〉〈mk + i|, (A.6)
and selecting the cases where both get the same outcome. This step resembles the procedure called advantage
distillation that has been studied in the classical setting [72] as well as in QKD protocols [73–75]. Indeed the subspace
selection in Step 3 aims to select the rounds in which higher correlations between Alice and Bob are observed. This is
exactly the objective of advantage distillation procedures such as the ones studied in [73–75]. However the procedures
studied in [73–75] consist of processing several rounds together (corresponding to a joint quantum operations in several
copies of the state) while the procedure given by Step 3 only involve one copy of the state (and corresponds to a single
copy filter operation).
8Now, note that the map implemented in Step 3 is a projection into subspaces, and this operation commutes with
both measurements of Alice and Bob. Therefore we can, instead, describe the QKD protocol as first Alice and Bob
perform the projection and then proceed with the measurements in the resulting state
ESubspaceQKDKAKBE′′←ABE(ρABE) = EIR−PAKAKBE′′←X′Y ′E′ ◦ (EMX′Y ′←A′B′ ⊗ idE) ◦ ESubA′B′E′←ABE(ρABE). (A.7)
So in order to perform the security analysis we will use this alternative description. Our goal is to determine the
state shared by the parties after the action of the map ESubA′B′E′←ABE . Initially, Eve distributes a state ρAB to Alice
and Bob such that she holds a purification of it
ρAB = TrE |ψABE〉〈ψABE | (A.8)
Applying the map ESubA′B′E′←ABE(|ψ〉ABE) leads to
EADA′B′E′←ABE(ρABE) = ρA′B′EM (A.9)
where the register M records the result of the projection, i.e. M takes value m if mA = mB = m, and M =⊥
otherwise:
ρA′B′EM =
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)ρmABE ⊗ |m〉〈m|M + p(M =⊥)| ⊥⊥〉〈⊥⊥ |AB ⊗ ρE ⊗ | ⊥〉〈⊥ |M (A.10)
where
ρmABE =
ΠmA ⊗ΠmB ⊗ IE(|ψABE〉〈ψABE |)ΠmA ⊗ΠmB ⊗ IE
p(M = m)
(A.11)
and p(M = m) is the probability that Alice and Bob get outcome m in the projection, given by
p(M = m) = Tr(ΠmA ⊗ΠmB ⊗ IE |ψABE〉〈ψABE |). (A.12)
Now, Alice and Bob will perform measurements on the state (A.10) in order to generate a key:
ρX′Y ′EM = EMX′Y ′←A′B′ ⊗ idEM (ρA′B′EM ) (A.13)
The entropy of Alice’s outcome after measuring the state ρA′B′EM , conditioned on the information available to the
eavesdropper is given by
H(X ′|EM)ρX′EM =
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X|EM = m)ρX′EM (A.14)
=
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X ′|E)ρm
X′E
(A.15)
≥
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X ′|E)ρ˜m
X′E
(A.16)
The first equation follows from the properties of conditional von Neumann entropy for cq-states. In the last step we
consider the entropy evaluated on the state that results from Alice and Bob applying the measurements to ρ˜A′B′EM ,
where
ρ˜A′B′EM =
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)ρ˜mABE ⊗ |m〉〈m|M + p(M =⊥)| ⊥⊥〉〈⊥⊥ |AB ⊗ ρE ⊗ | ⊥〉〈⊥ |M (A.17)
and
ρ˜mABE = TrE |ψmABE〉〈ψmABE | (A.18)
9where |ψmABE〉 is the purification of ρmAB . Giving Eve the purification of ρmAB before the measurements only increases
her power, which proves the lower bound. Similarly for the required information to be exchanged for information
reconciliation
H(X ′|Y ′M)ρX′Y ′M =
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X ′|Y ′M = m)ρX′Y ′M (A.19)
=
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X ′|Y ′)ρm
X′Y ′
(A.20)
=
`−1∑
m=0
p(M = m)H(X ′|Y ′)ρ˜m
X′Y ′
(A.21)
and the last step follows from the fact that ρ˜mAB = ρ
m
AB .
A.II. Solution of the SDP and the choice of W
In this appendix, we present in detail the optimization problem for calculating the average guessing probability of
Eve, and its solution. The average guessing probability is obtained by maximizing, over all possible tripartite states
ρABE (recall that Eve holds a purification of ρABE) and all possible measurements of Eve {Ee}e, the probability Pg
that Eve’s guesses Alice’s outcomes, and then performing a weighted average of these probabilities:
Pg = max
ρABE ,{Ee}d−1e=0
∑
e,y
Tr (ρABEA
e
1 ⊗By1 ⊗ Ee)
s.t. Tr
(
ŴρABE
)
= W,
ρABE ≥ 0,
Tr (ρABE) = 1,
Ee ≥ 0 ∀e,∑
e
Ee = 1,
(A.22)
where A1, B1 stand for the computational basis and Ŵ is the yet-to-be-defined operator, with W its measured value
that constrains the optimization. W will be constructed depending on which target state the experiment is trying to
produce. Here, we consider W to be the average value of equal outcomes that Alice and Bob get in the second basis,
W =
∑
x P (xx|22), which is the average value of the operator Ŵ =
∑
xA
x
2 ⊗ Bx2 . Our goal now is to express the
guessing probability as a function of W and d, by solving the following optimization problem which we obtain from
the previous one by substituting ρe := TrE (ρABEE
e):
Pg(W,d) = max{ρe}e
d−1∑
e=0
Tr (ρeA
e
∗ ⊗ 1d)
s.t. Tr
(
Ŵ
d−1∑
e=0
ρe
)
= W,
ρe ≥ 0 ,∀e ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1},
Tr
(
d−1∑
e=0
ρe
)
= 1,
whose dual is
min
γ,S
γ + SW,
s.t. γ1d2 + SŴ ≥ |e〉〈e| ⊗ 1d ,∀e.
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The eigenvalues of SŴ − |e〉〈e| ⊗ 1d, as a function of S and the local dimension d, for a given e are λ± =
S−1±
√
(S−1)2+4S(d−1)/d
2 (each one with degeneracy d) , and the optimization now reads:
min
γ,S
γ + SW,
s.t. γ + λ− ≥ 0 ∀e,
γ + λ+ ≥ 0 ∀e.
Since λ+ ≥ λ−, for all S, d, and λ± are the same for all e, we can relax the constraints to:
min
γ,S
γ + SW,
s.t. γ + λ− ≥ 0.
We finally solve ∂∂Sλ− = W, which gives
W =
1
2
(
1− 2S + 2− 4/d
2
√
(S − 1)2 + 4S(d− 1)/d
)
, S =
2
d
−1+1− 2W
d
√
d− 1
W (1−W ) and λ− = −
d− 1
d
−W
d
√
d− 1
W (1−W ) .
and obtain the form of the guessing probability as a function of W and d:
Pg(W,d) = −λ− + SW =
(√
W +
√
(d− 1)(1−W )
)2
d
.
A.III. Implementation with temporal degrees of freedom
We start by considering a hyper-entangled state of the form
|Ψ〉 = ∣∣φ−〉
AB
⊗
∫
dtf(t) |t〉A ⊗ |t〉B . (A.23)
This is the state of two entangled photons (one for Alice and one for Bob), with two degrees of freedom: the time of
arrival t of the photon at the respective labs of Alice and Bob and their polarization. The time of arrival, i.e., the
time at which the detector clicks, is a continuous variable, which can be discretized by considering time bins of size
tb. Setting a time frame F outside of which a photon is “lost” and taking F to be a multiple of tb we have effectively
a discrete system of dimension d = Ftb .
The probability that at the frame [0, F ] exactly n pairs of entangled photons are produced is given by the Poisson
distribution:
PF (n) =
(λF )ne−λF
n!
,
with λ being the production rate of the photon pairs. Both F and λ are tunable parameters, and we assume that λ
is small enough, such that multi-photon events in the same frame are negligible. In particular, we choose λ such that
PF (n ≥ 2) = 1− PF (0)− PF (1) = 1− (1 + λF )e−λF < .
The average number of photons per frame is λF and for λF < 0.2 we get PF (n ≥ 2) < 0.015, which is small enough
with respect to the noise scale in our model. Note, though, that by decreasing the production rate λ we are also
decreasing the key rate, see Equation (A.25) at the end of this section, therefore we should tune these parameters
carefully.
We consider two types of noise, namely the noise due to the interaction of the photons with the environment
before entering the labs of Alice and Bob, and the noise introduced due to the detectors’ inefficiency. Because of its
interaction with the environment, a photon can be lost with probability PL. Given n photons, the probability that
nL of them are lost while the rest arrive at the lab is P
nL
L (1− PL)n−nL( nnL).
Moreover, photons from the environment may be introduced in the system. We assume that the environment
produces on average ν photons per second. The number of photons arriving to the frame from the environment will
then follow the Poisson distribution, PE(n) = (νF )
ne−νF /(n!).
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As far as the noise due to the detectors is concerned, each detector has probability PC to click when a photon
arrives, and probability per second µ to click when no photon is there. These events are called dark counts and they
also follow the Poisson distribution, PD(n) = (µF )
ne−µF /(n!).
The probability that both Alice and Bob receive in their labs (i, j) photons in a time frame F is
P (i, j) =
∞∑
n=0
n∑
n1=max{n−i,0}
n∑
n2=max{n−j,0}
PF (n)P
n1
L (1−PL)n−n1
(
n
n1
)
Pn2L (1−PL)n−n2
(
n
n2
)
PE(i−n+n1)PE(j−n+n2).
Given that i photons enter, the probability of obtaining exactly one click in a frame F is
P (click|i) = (1− PC)i−1 (PCPD(0)i+ (1− PC)PD(1)) = e−µF (1− PC)i
(
iPC
1− PC + µF
)
,
and the probability that both Alice and Bob get one click is P (11) =
∑∞
i,j=0 P (click|i)P (click|j)P (i, j).
After applying the approximation PF (n ≥ 2) ≈ 0, we can calculate P (11) to be:
P (11) ≈ e−F [2(µ+νPC)+λ]Fβ,
with β :=
[
λα2 + F (µ+ νPC)
2
]
and α :=
[
PC(1− PL) + F (µ+ PCν)PL + F (µ+ νPC)(1− PC)(1− PL)
]
.
In the above expressions note that, if only a photon pair is produced, the probability that it passes and gets detected
is PC(1−PL), the probability that it passes but does not get detected is (1−PC)(1−PL), and the probability that it
gets lost is PL, and an environment photon or a dark count is making the click instead with probability (F (µ+νPC)).
The term e−2(µ+νPc)F is the probability that all the extra photons of the environment are not detected and there are
no dark counts. If there is no pair in the frame, the click must have come from the environment or it is a dark count.
If the setup is asymmetric (one detector is close to the source, the other is far), we can modify the formula to
include different parameters for Alice and Bob:
P (11) ≈ e−(µA+µB+νAPAC +νBPBC +λ)FF
[
λαAαB + F (µA + νAPAC )(µ
B + νBPBC )
]
.
In our noise model, we do not consider finite size effects (the number of rounds is sufficiently large), neither border
effects on the frame (F is sufficiently large, so the error of the clock that decides when the frame begins and ends is
negligible), nor errors related to the relaxation time of the detectors (which is the time a detector needs before being
able to detect another photon. If the frame were approximately the same size as the relaxation time this effect would
be important, but we choose F to be sufficiently large for this purpose). We also assume that the interaction with the
environment can only destroy a photon, and that the photon pairs coming from the environment are uncorrelated.
Furthermore, F and the production rate λ are chosen such that the probability of observing two or more entangled
photons during a single frame is negligible. With these assumptions, we have a model that gives us the rate of “valid”
rounds per second, as a function of F , which, in turn, is proportional to the local dimension d:
R(d) = P (11)/F = e−F [2(µ+νPC)+λ]β. (A.24)
For large F = d tb, we have β ≈ F (µ+ νPC)2[(1 + PCPL − PC)2 + λF ] ∝ F.
We can also estimate the visibility, i.e. the probability that – given that both parties had exactly one click – the
photons that clicked were the entangled ones coming from the laser source and not the environment or dark counts.
First, we calculate the probability of a photon pair to survive and get detected
PS = PF (1)(1− PL)2P 2Ce−2F (µ+νPC),
which gives the visibility as a function of the dimension d to be v(d) = PS/P (11) = λ(1 − PL)2P 2C/β, while for an
asymmetric setup we have v(d) = λ(1− PAL )(1− PBL )PAC PBC /β.
Finally, for large d, λ ∝ 1/F and β ∝ F , thus making the visibility scale as d−2.
In order to take into account multi-photon events, we write α and P (11) as
α(n) = (1− PC + PCPL)n−1
[
nPC(1− PL) + F (µ+ νPC)(1− PC + PCPL)
]
,
P (11) = e−(µ
A+µB+νAPAC +ν
BPBC )F
∞∑
n=0
PF (n)α
A(n)αB(n),
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and obtain
P (11) = e−F (TA+TB+γ)(F 2TATb + Fγ) and R = e−F (TA+TB+γ)(FTATb + γ), (A.25)
where S = 1− PC + PCPL, Q = µ+ νPC , TA/B = QA/B + λSB/A(1− SA/B) and γ = λ(1− SA)(1− SB).
Accordingly, the generalized success probability becomes
PS = e
−F (QA+QB)
∞∑
n=0
PF (n)(S
ASB)n−1(1− SA)(1− SB)n = e−F (TA+TB+γ)γF.
The maximum of PS is for F = 1/(TA + TB + γ), and the visibility becomes v = 1/(1 + FTATBγ
−1).
A.IV. Implementation with spatial degrees of freedom
A basic parameter of our model is ∆t, the coincidence window in which two events, for Alice and Bob, are considered
coincident. Note that multiple clicks in the same coincidence window are treated as a single event. Another parameter
is related to the projection of an infinite-dimensional entagled state of the form |Ψ〉 = ∑∞l=−∞ cl |l〉A ⊗ |−l〉B into a
finite dimensional space. This is the probability PP (d) := Tr
(
1d2 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|1d2
)
, which we assume to be constant, thus
providing lower dimensions with an advantage. One could give an advantage to higher dimensions by dropping this
assumption.
Alice
Losses (b)
Environmental 
photons (c)
Detectors (d)
Entanglement source (a)
Bob
FIG. A.1. A schematic represantation of the noise model: a laser source (a) produces entangled pairs distributed in time with
a Poisson distribution, with λ as the average number of photons per second. The pairs are distributed to the parties and suffer
from party-dependent losses (b) with probability PL. On top of the entangled photons the parties receive ν environmental
photons per second on average, distributed as well with a Poissonian. For each of the modes that are being measured, there is
an associated detector (d), which comes with an average number of dark counts µ per second and an efficiency PC .
In our model, we consider that a click can come either from the laser or from the environment or from the dark
counts. We start with the laser photons, by assuming that they follow a Poisson distribution, factorized by the
probability PP (d) of being within the modes −d/2 and d/2. The probability that the laser produces j detectable
photons given that n in total are emitted is (∆tλ)n e
−∆tλ
n! P
j
P (d)(1 − PP (d))n−j
(
n
j
)
. Given j photons produced from
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the laser, the probability they produce no click in one of the labs is
P (0|j) =
j∑
r=0
P j−rL (1− PL)r
(
j
r
)
(1− PC)r
(
r
0
)
= [1− PC(1− PL)]j = (1− T )j , where T = PC(1− PL),
while the probability that they produce one or more clicks in a single detector is
P (1|j) =
j∑
r1=1
P j−r1L (1− PL)r1
(
j
r1
) r1∑
r2=1
(
d−1
d
)r1−r2
(1− PC)r1−r2
(
1
d
)r2
[1− (1− PC)r2 ]
(
d
1
)(
r2
r1
)
= d
[ (
1− T + Td
)j − (1− T )j].
In the above, PL reflects the losses affecting the entangled photons, and we further assumed that all modes suffer the
same losses, therefore we absorbed them in PC . In case one would like to further refine the noise model, they could
consider different losses for different modes. We also calculate the probability that, given j photons were produced,
Alice and Bob both get one click from a laser photon in different detectors, as this way we account for entangled
photons. We have
P (6= |j) = d(d− 1)
j∑
r1,r2,r3=0
r0+r1+r2+r3=j
j−1∑
r0=0
j!
r0!r1!r2!r3!
× (PAL PBL )r0 [PBL (1− PAL )]r1 [PAL (1− PBL )]r2 [(1− PAL )(1− PBL )]r3×
×
r1∑
l1=0
(
d− 1
d
)r1−l1
(1− PAC )r1−l1
(
1
d
)l1 (r1
l1
)
×
r2∑
l2=0
(
d− 1
d
)r2−l2
(1− PBC )r2−l2
(
1
d
)l2 (r2
l2
)
×
×
r3∑
s3,p3,q3=0
s3+p3+q3=r3
(
1
d
)s3+p3 (d− 2
d
)q3
r3!
s3!p3!q3!
(1− PBC )s3+q3(1− PAC )p3+q3 × [1− (1− PAC )l1+s3 ][1− (1− PBC )l2+p3] =
= d(d− 1)
{
[(1− TA)(1− TB)]j +
[
(1− TA)(1− TB) + 1
d
[TA(1− TB) + TB(1− TA)]
]j
−
−
[
(1− TB)(1− TA + TA/d)
]j
−
[
(1− TA)(1− TB + TB/d)
]j}
.
Similarly, the probability that, given j photons, Alice and Bob both get one click from a laser photon in the same
detector is
P (= |j) = d
j∑
r1,r2,r3=0
r0+r1+r2+r3=j
j−1∑
r0=0
j!
r0!r1!r2!r3!
× (PAL PBL )r0 [PBL (1− PAL )]r1 [PAL (1− PBL )]r2 [(1− PAL )(1− PBL )]r3×
×
r1∑
l1=0
(
d− 1
d
)r1−l1
(1− PAC )r1−l1
(
1
d
)l1(
r1
l1
)
×
r2∑
l2=0
(
d− 1
d
)r2−l2
(1− PBC )r2−l2
(
1
d
)l2 (r2
l2
)
×
×
r3∑
l3=0
(
d− 1
d
)r3−l3 (1
d
)l3
(1− PBC )r3−l3(1− PAC )r3−l3
(
r3
l3
)
× [1− (1− PAC )l1+l3 ][1− (1− PBC )l2+l3] =
= d
{
[(1− TA)(1− TB)]j +
[
(1− TA)(1− TB) + 1
d
[TA(1− TB) + TB(1− TA) + TATB ]
]j
−
−
[
(1− TA + TA/d)(1− TB)
]j
−
[
(1− TA)(1− TB + TB/d)
]j}
,
We can now proceed to the clicks due to dark counts. Again, their distribution is Poissonian with multiple clicks
in the same detector counting as one. Therefore, the probability of no clicks in a single detector is e−∆tµ, while the
probability of one or more clicks in one detector is 1 − e−∆tµ. In total, the probability of n dark counts in all d
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detectors is PD(n, d) = (e
−∆tµ)d−n(1− e−∆tµ)n(dn), which also gives another quantity that we need: the probability
that, given that a detector already clicked because of a laser photon, all other detectors do not click because of dark
counts. Denoting this probability by P (0, d− 1), we have
P (0, d− 1) = PD(1, d)1
d
+ PD(0, d) = e
−(d−1)∆tµ.
Finally, we consider the last type of clicks that Alice and Bob register, the ones coming from environmental
photons. We assume that they are produced according to a Poisson distribution. Given r photons in the same mode,
the probability that at least one of them clicks is 1− (1−PC)r. Furthermore, the probability that r out of q photons
go in the same mode, one of them clicks, while all the others do not click is:
q∑
r=1
(
d− 1
d
)q−r
(1− PC)q−r
(
1
d
)r [
1− (1− PC)r
](q
r
)
=
[
1− PC(d− 1)
d
]q
− (1− PC)q,
and we multiply it with the Poissonian distribution of environmental photons and the number of modes to obtain
PE(1, d) = d
∞∑
q=0
(ν∆t)q
[
1− PC(d− 1)
d
]q
e−ν∆t
q!
− d
∞∑
q=0
(ν∆t)q(1− PC)q e
−ν∆t
q!
= dPE(0
∗, d)
(
1− e−PCν∆t/d
)
,
with PE(0
∗, d) = e−PCν∆t(d−1)/d, which is the probability that, in case a detector already clicked because of a laser
photon or a dark count, r out of q environmental photons end up in this detector, while the rest q − r end up in the
other detectors and none of them clicks. Note that losses affecting environmental photons are absorbed in ν.
With all the above in place, we can now calculate the quantities of interest, namely the visibility and the key rate.
We start with the probability that, given j photons locally, a single detector clicks
P (1) = P (1|j)PD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|j)PD(1, d)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|j)PD(0, d)PE(1, d)
= dPD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d)
[(
1− T + T
d
)j
− (1− T )je−∆t(µ+PCν/d)
]
,
and we continue with the probability that both parties get a single click
P (11) =
∞∑
n=0
n∑
j=0
(∆tλ)n
e−∆tλ
n!
P jP (d)[1− PP (d)]n−j
(
n
j
)
× {[P (1|j)PD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|n)PD(1, d)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|n)PD(0, d)PE(1, d)]A×
× [P (1|j)PD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|n)PD(1, d)PE(0∗, d) + P (0|n)PD(0, d)PE(1, d)]B+
+ [PD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d)]A[PD(0, d− 1)PE(0∗, d)]B [P (6= |j) + P (= |j)− PA(1|j)PB(1|j)]
}
=
= de−∆t(d−1)(µ
A+ξA/d+µB+ξB/d)e−∆tγ
{
d
(
1− e−∆t(µA+ξA/d)
)(
1− e−∆t(µB+ξB/d)
)
+ e∆tγ/d − 1
}
,
where
ξA/B = P
A/B
C ν
A/B + PP (d)λP
B/A
C (1− PB/AL )(1− PA/BC + PA/BC PA/BL ) and
are all experimental constants independent of d. Note that γ is the same as in the previous implementation of temporal
encoding, and represents the average number of detectable entangled photons, while ξ represents the environmental
and laser photons that click independently in the labs. We are now able to write that the rate of “valid” rounds per
second is
R(d) =
P (11)
∆t
= Ce−d(µ
A+µB)e(ξ
A+ξB)/d
{
d2
[
1− e−(µA+ξA/d)
][
1− e−(µB+ξB/d)
]
+ d
(
eγ/d − 1
)}
,
where C = e∆t(µ
A+µB−ξB−ξB−γ)/∆t.
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Finally, in order to get the expression for the visibility, we need the probability that an entangled pair clicks on
both labs, while all other detectors do not click. However, once the detectors click because of the entangled pair,
they might also receive any number of other photons and register dark counts. We can go around this cumbersome
calculations, by directly considering the probability that the same detector clicks for both Alice and Bob (which is
due to the correlated photons and the noise), and subtract the probability that different detectors click (which is due
to the noise only). Essentially, we subtract the P (6= |j) contribution in P (11) from its P (= |j) contribution to obtain
PS = de
−∆t(d−1)(µA+ξA/d+µB+ξB/d)e−∆tγ
(
e∆tγ/d − 1
)
,
which, in turn, gives us the visibility
v(d) =
PS
P (11)
=
1
1 + d
(
1− e−∆t(µA+ξA/d)) (1− e−∆t(µB+ξB/d)) (e∆tγ/d − 1)−1 .
By re-scaling with ∆t, we can also write
v(d) =
eγ/d − 1
eγ/d − 1 + d[1− e−(µA+ξA/d)][1− e−(µB+ξB/d)] .
Note that for large d and small ∆t the visibility scales as v(d) ≈ 1
1+d2∆tµAµBγ−1 .
